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Abstract In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is in-
vestigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is
constructed. The model is a modication of the classic 2-person prisoner's
dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an abil-
ity to take into account the inuence only to the adjacent players from the
whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make
a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players.
This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a
continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan
L.A. in 2021.
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1. Introduction
Many game theory papers are devoted to two-person games. The classic exam-
ple in this class of games is the two-person prisoner's dilemma game. The game
represents a conict of interests of two prisoners. Each of them is asked to reduce
their prison sentences by extraditing their accomplice. Oers of betrayal are made
to prisoners at the same time, and they have to decide to cooperate with the inves-
tigation immediately without being able to talk to their accomplices. Cooperation
with the investigation reduces the term of imprisonment of the prisoner, even if his
accomplice also decided to "give up", but extends the term of imprisonment of the
accomplice.
In this paper we consider the n-person prisoner's dilemma that was proposed
by Hamburger (1973), in his paper on N-person prisoner's dilemma. Stran (1993)
later developed his idea. He constructed a Nash equilibrium for a static game that
was similar to the two-person model and shows the connections of the model to its
prototype.
Here, this model is considered on the network. In this case, however, it is dicult
to draw an analogy with the meaning that was the basis of the prisoner's dilemma.
We think that this model can be used for any other dilemmas that arise in our
lives and may have implications for the whole society. By looking at the model on
a network, it is possible to model contemporary problems such as vaccination.
In such a problem statement, each of the players must decide to vaccinate himself
or not (this corresponds to the strategies "to cooperate" / "to deviate" of the
initial model). Vaccination is not an absolute guarantee not to get sick, but, when
most of neighbors are vaccinated from their social networks, risk is almost minimal.
That is why each of the players can increase the payos of all his relatives by
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vaccinating, but since the vaccination itself can cause some discomfort, the dominant
strategy remains "not to vaccinate" ("to deviate"). In this way, it is possible to dene
unequivocally that the prisoner's dilemma continues to be relevant, and moreover,
its treatment in the case of n players on the network adds the possibility of exploring
a wider range of problems. In the case of a cooperative game, it will be possible
to talk about nding the number of players whose vaccination will lead to the
maximum gain of society (sucient number of people will be brought into form
"herd immunity").
2. n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma on the Network
2.1. Model Description
Let Γ be a static game. A set of players is N that has a cardinality |N | = n. All
the players have two pure strategies: C ("to cooperate") and D ("to deviate"). Let
the players be the nodes of a network M that represents the connections between
players as the edges of the network.
The payo function of the player i is Hi that depends on the strategy of the
player i and the number of the adjacent players that choose the strategy C, ∀ i ∈ N :
Hi (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn) =

Ci (x) = a1x
i
N + b1, ∀ x ∈ (0, n] , if xi = C and xiN
is the number of players from the set N that are
adjacent to the player i and choose
the strategy C,
Di (x) = a2x
i
N + b2, ∀ x ∈ [0, n) , if xi = D and xiN
is the number of players from the set N that are
adjacent to the player i and choose
the strategy C.
(1)
Let x̄iN be the number of players from the set N that are adjacent to the player
i.
The payo function Hi (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn) meets the following conditions:
(1) a1x
i
N + b1 < a2x
i




, since the strategy D strictly dominates
the strategy C,∀i ∈ N .
(2) a1x̄
i
N + b1 > b2, so, Hi (C, . . . , C) > Hi (D, . . . ,D).
(3) a1 ≥ a2 and a1 > 0, a2 > 0, therefore, a1xiN + b1 ≥ b1 and a2xiN + b2 ≥ b2.
2.2. Cooperative Game
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. Any nonempty subset S ⊆ N is
called a coalition.
Denition 1. The cooperative solution is the prole of strategies that maximize
the sum of all player's payos.
Denition 2. By a characteristic function of an n-person game we mean a function
V (S) that assigns a value to each subset of players V : 2N → R in such a way, that
V (S) is the payo to the subset S ⊆ N if they maximize the sum of the payos of
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the players from the subset S, whereas the players from the set N \ S act against
S. V (S) is called the value of the coalition S:








, S ⊆ N,
where µS ∈ X̄S , νN\S and Γ̄ =
(
X̄S , X̄N\S , HS
)
is a mixed extansion of the zero-
sum game Γ .
The characteristic function represents the guaranteed total payo for the players
in a given coalition.
Theorem 1 (Cooperative solution). In the cooperative solution player i will






Proof. Player i should use the strategy D, if the gain of the player i from choosing
of the dominant strategy, in contrast to the strategy C is greater than losses of the
adjacent players from his "betraying".
Therefore, the player i chooses the strategy D to maximize the sum of payos of
all the players from the coalition N , if the unequality a1x̄
N
i < (a2 − a1) x̄Ni +b2−b1
holds.
Then, the player i will choose the strategy C in the cooperative solution, if
a1x̄
N
i ≥ (a2 − a1) x̄Ni + b2 − b1. (3)
Consequently, if b2−b12a1−a2 is less than the number of players from the set N that
are adjacent to the player i, then this player will choose the strategy C in the
cooperative solution.
⊓⊔
The same ratio can be found for the coalition S ⊆ N :
If the number of players from the set S ⊆ N that are adjacent to the player i
satises the relation x̄iN ≥
b2−b1
2a1−a2 , then in the cooperative solution the player i will
choose the strategy C. Otherwise, he will choose D.
Therefore, the characteristic function of a cooperative game for n-person pris-
oner's dilemma on the network can be written as:
























, otherwise xj = D
)
. (6)
In case, if it is possible to construct this characteristic function for our vac-
cination dilemma, it will be possible to nd the number of people required to be
vaccinated and, moreover, to know for what number of interactions, a person should
give preference to vaccination in order to achieve herd immunity.
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Example 1 (3-person game).
Consider the payo function for the 3-person prisoner's dilemma game on the
network M :
HMi (x1, x2, x3) =

Ci (x) = 16x
i
N + 1, if x
i = C;
Di (x) = 16x
i
N + 18, if x
i = D.
The network M for this game is represented in the gure 1.
2
1 3
Fig. 1. An example of the network M for the 3-person prisoner's dilemma game.
Next, we construct the characteristic function of the resulting game on the basis
of ratios relative to the neighbors of each of the players. In accordance with the
payo function, player from the coalition S should choose the strategy C, if the





As we see from 1, this ratio can only be met for the second player if all players
belong to the coalition S.
Table 1. This is the example table.
S Unequalities V (S)
ø 1 /∈ S, 2 /∈ S, 3 /∈ S 0
1 x̄1S <
18−1
2∗16−16 , 2 /∈ S, 3 /∈ S 18
2 1 /∈ S, x̄2S < 18−12∗16−16 , 3 /∈ S 18
3 1 /∈ S, 2 /∈ S, x̄3S < 18−12∗16−16 18






2∗16−16 , 3 /∈ S 36
(1, 3) x̄1S <
18−1



















We can see that the maximum of the sum of players' payos for the grand
coalition is not necessarily achieved by all players choosing a strategy C. This is
not an obligatory condition for players' payos in the n-person prisoner's dilemma
on the network game. Moreover, the lack of this assumption allows us to model
situations such as vaccination. As we can see, we still have all the basic features of
the game's prototype that is the two-person prisoner's dilemma.
3. Conclusion
In this paper, a cooperative game was constructed to model the n-person pris-
oner's dilemma on the network, with players having a pairwise inuence on each
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other's payos. The proposed game model can address problems such as the number
of vaccinated people that are needed to stop the pandemic. However, this study can
be continued by considering not only the inuence of adjacent players, but also the
discounted inuence of more distant players on the network.
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